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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
to make a thorough investigation, and that the ultimate beneficiary will not be
the wrongdoer but will be the innocent victim.
The O'Connor case, as it effects an insurer's right to rescind under the
Assigned Risk Plan, is really moot because Section 313 of the Vehicle and
Traffic Law is all inclusive.8 Therefore, it clearly supersedes the promulgations
of the Superintendent of Insurance to the extent that they provide for cancel-
lation. However, the O'Connor case is indicative of the present Court of
Appeal's thinking on an insurer's right to rescind for fraud once an innocent
third party has been injured by the insured. New Jersey and other jurisdictions
have arrived at the same position under their Financial Responsibility Acts.0
A recent case in the Appellate Division, Tetter v. Allstate Insurance Con-
pany, held that the notice required in Section 313 of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law had abolished the insurer's common law right to rescission ab initio, even
though there was no injury to an innocent third party.'0 The court reasoned
that to allow rescission ab initio would, one, make it impossible for the insured
to comply with the statute (insured is required to have continuous coverage),
and two, render him retroactively guilty of a misdemeanor (operating a motor
vehicle without insurance coverage).
It would appear that the determining factor in this area is the fear that
innocent victims of auto accidents may suffer. Although the Tetter case did
not involve an innocent victim, to reverse the case on appeal the Court of
Appeals would have to decide that the right to rescind was defeated only when
an innocent third party was involved, and to indicate that his prior acts were
lawful. To reverse, therefore, would require a strained interpretation of the
statute. These two cases should give the insurance companies writing auto-
mobile liability insurance clear notice that once they issue the FS-1 form the
only way they can terminate is by complying with the statute. This burden
(prior investigation before issuance of the policy) imposed on the insurance
companies is far down the scale of values when compared with the benefits to
innocent victims and society as a whole.
R.E.N.
FOREIGN LIFE INSURER LICENSED IN STATE MAY CONTROL INSURANCE Fnus
ENGAGED N NoN-LIFE BusiNss
In Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Superintendent of Ins., the Court of Appeals
held that an out-of-state life insurance company licensed in New York can gain
control of another company which deals in fire and casualty insurance and still
maintain the privilege of issuing life insurance in New York."
8. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313:
. . every insurance policy for which a certificate of insurance (FS-1 form) has
been issued.
9. Atlantic Casualty Insurance Company v. Bingham, 10 N.J. 460, 92 A.2d 1
1952; see also Annot., 171 A.L.R. 550 (1947) and 34 A.L.R.2d 1297 (1954).
10. 9 A.D.2d 176, 192 N.Y.S.2d 610 (4th Dep't 1959).
11. 10 N.Y.2d 42, 217 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
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The plaintiff, an out-of-state insurance company contemplating such an
acquisition, brought an action for a declaratory judgment on this issue. The
Superintendent of Insurance had previously informed the plaintiff that such a
transaction was forbidden by New York law. Following the passage of an
amendment to Section 90(1) of the Insurance Law in 1958, the Superintendent
issued a regulation to this effect.' 2 The Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiff's
motion and this ruling was affirmed by the Appellate Division.'3
The Court of Appeals, reversing these decisions and granting the declara-
tory judgment in favor of the plaintiff, ruled that Section 42(3) and Section
193(2) of the Insurance Law do prohibit out-of-state life insurance companies
from issuing fire or casualty insurance, but these laws do not prohibit control
of another firm doing such business.' 4 The Court maintained that the only
test used to determine whether such a purchase is permissible is based on the
measure of the foreign firm's admitted assets. Since the plaintiff can pass this
test created by Section 90(1), they concluded it can acquire control of the
other firm and continue to issue life insurance.' 5 This conclusion was reached
by strictly interpreting the pertinent statutes and by relying on past decisions
holding that the business of a subsidiary corporation cannot be considered the
business of the parent.' 6 The majority bolstered their conclusion by thoroughly
reviewing the history of New York law in this area. They pointed out that under
previously existing laws both Aetna and Travelers, out-of-state life insurance
companies licensed in New York, were allowed to purchase controlling interest
in fire and casualty companies and these arrangements have been allowed to
continue in existence with no harmful results.
12. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1958, ch. 981.
13. 24 Misc. 2d 927, 200 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1960); 11 A.D.2d 403, 207 N.Y.S.2d
335 (1st Dep't 1960).
14. N.Y. Ins. Law § 42(3):
No foreign insurer shall be licensed to do in this state any kind of insurance busi-
ness, or combination of kinds of insurance business, which are not permitted to
be done by domestic insurers hereafter to be licensed under the provisions of this
chapter.
N.Y. Ins. Law § 193(2):
No alien life insurance company licensed to do a life insurance business in this
state shall, within the United States, and no foreign life insurance company licensed
to do business in this state shall, except as stated in subsection six of section forty-
two, within or without this state, do any kind or kinds of business other than
those specified in paragraphs one, two, and three of section forty-six.
15. N.Y. Ins. Law § 90(1):
. . . For the purposes of this subsection, the investments of a foreign insurer shall
be deemed to comply in substance with the investment requirements and limitations
imposed by this chapter upon like domestic insurers hereafter organized to do the
same kind or kinds of insurance business if, after disallowing as admitted assets
in whole or in part any of its investments which do not comply with such invest-
ment requirements and limitations, the superintendent finds that the resulting
surplus to policyholders of such foreign insurer would not be reduced below an
amount which is reasonable in relation to the insurer's outstanding liabilities and
adequate to its financial needs; but in no event below an amount equal to the
minimum surplus to policyholders required on organization of a domestic insurer
to do the same kind or kinds of insurance business. ....
16. People v. American Bell Tel. Co., 117 N.Y. 241, 22 N.E. 1057 (1899); Light &
Power Installation Co. v. Kelsey, 101 App. Div. 205, 91 N.Y. Supp. 709 (3d Dep't 1905).
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The majority decided that if an out-of-state firm can prove its financial
stability by passing the test created by Section 90(1), then the holders of life
insurance policies with the out-of-state firm are adequately protected even if
that firm takes on the risk of financially backing a company which deals in
the generally unstable area of fire and casualty insurance.
The dissent, liberally interpreting the pertinent statutes and reasoning that
allowing an out-of-state life insurance company to control a fire and casualty
insurance company would place a holder of a life insurance policy with the out-
of-state firm in as great jeopardy as if the out-of-state firm issued the com-
paratively risky fire and casualty insurance itself, concluded that such a
transaction should not be allowed. The dissent reasoned that Section 90(3)
which states: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve any
foreign or alien insurer from compliance with any other provision of this
chapter," invalidates the majority's theory that only one test is used to
determine if such a purchase is permissible. Their position is that Section 90
was amended only to change the procedure of valuing an out-of-state company's
assets, and the amendment did not alter the prohibitions of Sections 42 and 193
which the dissent contended, forbids a foreign life insurer from entering into
the fire and casualty field.
R.D.S.
LABOR LAW
COURTS LACK JURISDICTION OVER DISPUTE "ARGUABLY SUBJECT" TO NLRB
UNTIL NLRB DECLINES JURISDICTION
The Labor Management Relations Act gives the National Labor Relations
Board jurisdiction over labor disputes involving the owners of American regis-
tered ships, crew members, and labor unions.' This means that the rigid regu-
lations governing ships of American registry must be complied with even if
the ships do little domestic trade.2 To escape these regulations, American
owners have registered their ships in foreign countries such as Liberia, where reg-
ulations are minimal. In the past, the NLRB has asserted jurisdiction over
American-owned ships with foreign registry where there was a fair amount of
domestic trade involved, even though the crew was largely foreign.3 "When
an activity is arguably subject to Section 7 or Section 8 of the Act, the state
as well as federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National
Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy
is to be averted."'4 In such cases, where the NLRB may or may not have
1. 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1958).
2. Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
3. Peninsular & Occidental S.S. Co., 42 LRRM 1269 (1961).
4. San Diego Building Trades Council Unions v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
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